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Tax Law And Women
Implications Of The 1981 Tax Act
By Gary L. Maydew and Paula C. Morrow
The financial press is quick to 
identify and report on the impact of 
tax law changes on various special 
interest groups, e.g., the oil industry, 
agriculture, and those on fixed in­
comes. However, the impact on 
women of tax law changes is less 
frequently mentioned. It appears that 
tax specialists, while they spring 
readily to the defense of their in­
dividual client’s tax shelters, rarely 
get very animated about the tax in­
terests of women. Accordingly, the 
purpose of this paper is to identify 
and critique several recent federal 
tax law changes that have affected 
women. Five areas of tax law will be 
reviewed: child care expenses, the 
marriage tax penalty, alimony, de­
pendency deductions for children of 




Prior to 1976, taxpayers could 
derive a tax benefit from child care 
expenditures only by itemizing 
deductions.1 The maximum per­
missible deduction was rather insig­
nificant until 1971 when the Revenue 
Act of 1971 greatly increased the 
maximum possible deduction. It was 
increased again in 1975.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 elimi­
nated the deduction for child care 
and substituted in its place a 20% 
tax credit. The credit was limited to 
$200 for one child or other eligible 
dependent and $400 for two or more 
care recipients.2 The Revenue Act of 
1978 contained an amendment 
which allowed the credit to be taken 
for payments to relatives.3
The Economic Recovery Act of 
1981 (hereafter the 81 Act) greatly in­
creased the maximum possible cred­
it, from $200 to $720 for one child, 
and $400 to $1,440 for two or more 
children.4 However, a limited phase­
out of the tax benefit was again im­
posed. In essence, there is now a 
base credit percentage of 20% of the 
employment-related expenses. Tax­
payers with an adjusted gross in­
come of $10,000 or less may get as 
much as a 30% credit, but this is 
reduced by 1% for each $2,000 of 
child care expense in excess of 
$10,000. Figure 1 graphically depicts 
the new child care credit available to 
taxpayers in 1982.
A Critique
The net effect of the 1976 changes 
in child care was not beneficial to 
most taxpayers. While in theory the 
substitution of the credit for the 
deduction appeared to achieve 
greater progressivity, it was 
achieved only at the extreme lower 
parts of the tax bracket. For exam­
ple, in 1975 the marginal tax rate ex­
ceeded 20% for single taxpayers at 
the rather low level of $4,000 of tax­
able income. In other words, assum­
ing that the taxpayer could itemize 
deductions, he or she would have to 
have taxable income less than 
$4,000 in order to receive more tax 
benefit from the credit than he or she 
would receive from the deduction. 
Congress apparently felt that upper 
middle income taxpayers were deriv­
ing too much benefit from the deduc­
tion. A look at the IRS’s own 
statistics, however, indicates other­
wise.5 Of the $1,331,364,000 
deducted for child care in 1975, only 
$551,892,000 was deducted by tax­
payers with an adjusted gross in­
come of $15,000 or larger and 
$461,498,000 of that was deducted by 
taxpayers with an adjusted gross 
$15-20,000. Clearly upper middle in­
come taxpayers weren’t benefitting 
much in the aggregate. But were 
upper middle income taxpayers 
deducting much more per return 
than lower level taxpayers? Again, 
the facts indicate otherwise. Of those 
deducting child care expenses, the 
average deduction per adjusted 














The 81 Act is a step forward in that 
the limits have been raised to more 
realistic amounts, and the sliding 
scale percentage credit achieves 
some progressivity. However, the 
percentage allowed (20 to 30%) is 
inadequate, and the credit should be 
made a refundable credit, i.e. in­
dividuals should be able to get a re­
fund for part of their child care costs 
if they owe no tax and therefore can­
not derive any benefit from off-set­
ting it against the tax they owe. Many 
low income taxpayers with depend­
ents do not generate enough in­
come to reach the taxable level; con­
sequently, the non-refundable credit 
does not help them.
The child care credit is not avail-
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able if married taxpayers file sepa­
rately. This appears overly restric­
tive, especially given the fact that in 
some states (for example, Ohio) 
state income taxes may be 
minimized by filing separately.
Finally, credit provisions associ­
ated with two or more children pre­
sent an interesting paradox. First, 
since marginal child care costs per 
child frequently decrease (e.g., day 
care centers often have family rates), 
it seems illogical to permit a family 
with two children to claim twice the 
tax benefit of a single child family. 
On the other hand, the rationale for 
failing to provide pro-rated tax relief 
for additional children is equally 
unclear. The implication, intended or 




A brief history of tax policies re­
lated to income splitting will be 
given in order to provide some 
perspective to this complicated 
issue. Prior to 1948, married tax­
payers had no special rate schedule. 
Since proportionately few wives 
worked, the need for an income split­
ting rate schedule would have been 
slight were it not for the fact that 
seven western states (and Loui­
siana) were (and still are) com­
munity property states. Since income 
in a community property state is 
legally owned half by each spouse 
regardless of who earns the income, 
married taxpayers in community 
property states were able to split 
their income and thus reduce their 
marginal tax rates. In response to 
this obvious inter-state tax inequity, 
Congress in 1948 created a joint 
return schedule which extended in­
come splitting benefits to all married 
taxpayers, regardless of the state 
property laws.6
One result of the 1948 law was to 
leave unmarried individuals at a dis­
tinct disadvantage relative to mar­
ried taxpayers. Hence, in 1969, Con­
gress attempted to remedy the plight 
of singles by creating an additional 
rate schedule, which would enable 
singles to pay less tax than married 
people filing separately would pay. 
But this law change, as is true of 
many, had an unintended impact. 
The tax result was to seriously 
penalize couples with approximately 
the same amount of income should 
they marry. For example, a couple 
with itemized deductions of 23% of 
their adjusted gross income, each of 
whom earn $30,000, would incur a 
penalty of $2,166 by marrying. Em­
barrassed by the obvious tax plan­
ning recommendation of the mar­
riage penalty, i.e., “living in sin,” the 
Senate Finance Committee included 
a provision in the 81 Act to reduce 
the marriage penalty because “large 
tax penalties on marriage under­
mines respect for the family . . .”7 
Starting in 1982, married couples 
who both have earned income will 
receive a deduction for adjusted 
gross income of 5% of the lesser of 
the qualified earned income of the 
spouse on $30,000. The percentage 
goes to 10% in 1983.
A Critique
In its attempt to alleviate the per­
ceived tax inequities, Congress 
achieved only a partial correction of 
the tax inequity (in this case, the 
marriage penalty). Moreover, these 
half-hearted changes have the addi­
tional effect of introducing even 
more complexity into our tax laws.8
At present there are five different 
tax rates depending on one’s filing 
status. In 1968 there were only three 
and in 1947 only one. What is a 
possible remedy? Here are some 
thoughts on the subject by a 
respected economist:
“The practical effect of income 
splitting is to produce large 
differences in the tax burdens 
of single persons and married 
couples, differences which de­
pend on the rate of graduation 
and not on the level of rates. 
Such differences are difficult to 
rationalize on any theoretical 
grounds,. . . .One of the major 
reasons for acceptance of the 
consequences of income split­
ting may well be the fact that 
personal exemptions do not 
provide enough differentiation 
among taxpayers in the middle 
and top brackets. . . . The 
source of the difficulty in the in­
come-splitting approach is that 
differentiation among families 
by size is made through the rate 
structure rather than the per­
sonal exemption.9
A rational solution to the dilemma 
would be to eliminate inequities as­
sociated with family size by allowing 
a single realistic exemption deduc­
tion for each dependent and spouse.
The law implies that the two- 




Women are usually recipients of 
alimony. However, it is helpful in any 
business negotiation to be aware of 
the tax implications to the other 
party. Hence, we will discuss the tax 
implications to both payers and 
receivers of alimony.
Payers of Alimony
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 con­
tained a modest improvement (in an 
indirect way) for divorced women. 
The deduction for alimony paid was 
changed from a deduction from ad­
justed gross to a deduction for ad­
justed gross income.10 This enables 
payers of alimony to obtain a deduc­
tion whether or not they are able to 
itemize. Thus to the extent that a tax 
savings if attained from this law 
change, alimony payers would have 
additional resources with which to 
pay alimony.
Receivers of Alimony
There have been no recent 
changes in the taxation of alimony 
received. Periodic alimony (that 
which will continue for an indefinite 
period) is includible in gross in­
come.11 On the other hand, property 
settlements, even if paid in install­
ments of up to 10 years, are not taxed 
to the recipient.12 Also, payments 
that are specifically designated as 
child support are excludable from 
gross income.13
The 81 Act does provide one small 
benefit for recipients of alimony 
which permits a person a deduction 
for up to $1,125 of alimony receipts 
which are contributed to an IRA. Pre­
viously, non-working recipients of 
alimony were not able to provide tax- 
sheltered retirement savings since 
alimony was not considered com­
pensation income.
The Woman CPA, January, 1982/5
Divorce laws divide families 
and create dependency 
deduction disputes.
A Critique
In a larger sense, Congress has 
failed to correct a basic inequity in 
this area. We are referring to the fact 
that periodic alimony payments are 
taxed to the recipient. The rationale 
for taxing the receipt of alimony is 
that it constitutes a division of one 
spouse’s income. This concept is at 
best only partially true. Often 
alimony is in substance either a form 
of property settlement substitute, a 
subsidy that enables the spouse to 
retrain for the job market, a means of 
instituting punitive damages, or a 
form of a welfare payment (i.e., a 
payment necessary in order to pre­
vent an elderly or unemployable 
spouse from going on welfare). Out 
of the above forms of alimony, only 
punitive damages seem to be a 
transfer that meets the usual defini­
tions of gross income. Property set­
tlements usually do not create a tax­
able event to the recipients while 
retraining and welfare payments are 
transfer payments, and transfer pay­
ments typically are not taxed.
Dependency Deduction 
for Children of Divorced
Taxpayers
The Law
Divorce creates divided families 
and correspondingly creates dis­
putes about who should receive the 
dependency deduction for the 
children. Section 152(e) and Reg. 
1.152-4 contain the special rule 
describing the dependency deduc­
tion for children of divorced or sepa­
rated parents. Generally, the custody 
parent (the parent with custody for 
the greatest portion of the year) 
receives the dependency deduction. 
However, the noncustodial parent, 
usually the husband, can receive the 
exemption if he either:
1. is entitled to the exemption ac­
cording to the divorce decree 
and provides at least $600 for 
each child’s support or:
2. provides at least $1,200 for 
each child’s support and the 
other parent cannot verify hav­
ing provided over 50% of sup­
port.
Figure 2 depicts the sequence of cir­
cumstances under which one may 
legally claim the dependency deduc­
tion. Moreover, there are additional 
implications of this tax issue. First, in 
order to qualify for head of house­
hold filing status, a divorced parent 
must have custody of any children 
involved. Thus, even when the non­
custodial parent provides over 50% 
of child-related expenses and could 
then possibly pay the claim depen­
dency deductions for the children, 
he or she would not qualify as head 
of household. Meanwhile, the 
custodial parent will likely qualify for 
the head of household status. Some 
taxpayers feel that an affluent non­
custodial parent incurs a double or 
even triple penalty under these 
regulations: physical loss of 
children, possible loss of dependen­
cy deductions, and loss of the rela­
tively favorable filing status of head 
of household. Taxpayers cognizant
FIGURE 2
Decision Tree — 
Dependency Deductions For Children Of Divorced Taxpayers
Is taxpayer the custody parent?
yes
Does the divorce decree give the taxpayer the exemption 
deduction?
no
Does the divorce decree give the taxpayer the exemption 
deduction?
Yes No Yes No
Did the other party provide 
both over 50% of support 
and $1200 for each child?
Did the other party provide 
$600 for each child?
Did the taxpayer provide 
$600 for the support of 
each child?
Did the taxpayer provide 
over 50% of support and 
$1200 for each child?
no yes yes no yes
Take 
deduction
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of tax advantages associated with 
the custody of children could seek to 
minimize their taxes by allocating 
child custody between the divorcing 
parents. Barring other considera­
tions for separating siblings, such 
an outcome would seem to be an un­
fortunate and unintentional by­





The most favorable impact on 
women of the 81 Act was probably in 
the area of interspousal transfers. 
The 81 Act removed all restrictions 
on the marital deduction for both 
estate and gift tax purposes. Thus 
one spouse can now transfer an 
unlimited amount of property via 
either gift or inheritance.14 Just as 
importantly, the “fractional-interest 
rule’’ for jointly held property was 
repealed, meaning that only half of 
the value of jointly-held property is 
included in the estate at death, even 
if the decedent contributed over one- 
half of the cost of the property.15 The 
new law is effective for gifts and 
deaths after 12-31-81.
Prior to the 81 Act, wives who 
worked with their husbands on a 
family farm or business often found 
to their dismay that upon the death of 
their husband, all of the property 
was considered to be owned by the 
husband and was therefore all sub­
ject to the estate tax. Before The Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, the law provided 
that “the entire value of jointly held 
property is included in a decedent’s 
gross estate unless the executor 
submits sufficient evidence to show 
that property was not acquired en­
tirely with consideration furnished 
by the decedent, or was acquired by 
the decedent and the other joint 
owner or owners by gift, bequest, 
devise, or inheritance.16 In the case 
of a family business or farm, the hus­
band was considered to have fur­
nished all of the labor and cash 
unless the wife had outside earnings 
which she put into the business. This 
eventuality was referred to as the 
“widow’s tax,” since upon the death 
of the husband the estate tax 
reduced the widow’s net wealth.
In response to complaints about 
the “widow’s tax,” Congress incor­
porated into The Revenue Act of 
1978 a provision which allowed the 
executor of the estate to exclude 
from the taxable estate of the dece­
dent a certain percentage of proper­
ty held jointly with the survivor.17
A Critique
Although a partial remedy to the 
problem of jointly-held property, the 
78 provision was both uneven in its 
impact and slight in its impact.18 
Hence, the 81 Act represents a major 
and dramatic tax law improvement 
for women, perhaps the most impor­
tant since 1913.
Recommendations
In examining the recent law 
changes with respect to child care 
expenses, the marriage tax penalty, 
alimony, and taxes on jointly-held 
property some progress has been 
evidenced; but it is apparent that 
much remains to be done. Since 
Congress is very much a political 
animal, it would seem that women 
should exert more pressure on the 
House and the Senate to amend 
these laws. In recent years, taxation 
has been used more and more fre­
quently as an instrument for achiev­
ing social change. There is no 
reason why women should not use it 
as a means to achieve some of their 
goals until such time as men and 
women receive such equitable treat­
ment under tax laws that women will 
no longer constitute a special in­
terest group.
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